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Abstract
We propose networkmetrics, a new data-driven approach for monitoring, troubleshooting and understanding communication net-
works using multivariate analysis. Networkmetric models are powerful machine-learning tools to interpret and interact with data
collected from a network. In this paper, we illustrate the application of Multivariate Big Data Analysis (MBDA), a recently proposed
networkmetric method with application to Big Data sets. We use MBDA for the detection and troubleshooting of network problems
in a campus-wide Wi-Fi network. Data includes a seven-year trace (from 2012 to 2018) of the network’s most recent activity, with
approximately 3,000 distinct access points, 40,000 authenticated users, and 600,000 distinct Wi-Fi stations. This is the longest
and largest Wi-Fi trace known to date. To analyze this data, we propose learning and visualization procedures that extend MBDA.
These procedures result in a methodology that allows network analysts to identify problems and diagnose and troubleshoot them,
optimizing the network performance. In the paper, we go through the entire workflow of the approach, illustrating its application in
detail and discussing processing times for parallel hardware.
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1. Introduction
Multivariate exploratory analysis has been recognized as an
outstanding approach in several domains, including industrial
monitoring [1], network security [2], marketing [3], weather
modeling [4], bioinformatics [5], food research [6], and so
forth. In this methodology, visualization, interpretation and
data interaction are the principal tools for an analyst to interact
and understand data and the problem the data reflects. This is an
alternative data-driven approach to the one currently dominat-
ing machine learning, e.g., deep-learning, in which the model
is built as a black box to approximate an output of interest and
little interpretation is left to the analyst.
There are advantages and disadvantages in the approach of
multivariate exploratory analysis. A main shortcoming is that
the analyst has to be proficient in the modeling approach used
and knowledgeable about the type of data under analysis, just
like a blacksmith needs to be proficient with the hammer and
knowledgeable about the properties of metals. However, the
benefit is worth the price. Multivariate exploratory analysis is
useful to address specific questions, like “what is the best clas-
sification of an individual, given a set of classes”, or “what is
∗Corresponding author: J. Camacho (email: josecamacho@ugr.es)
the best prediction of a future outcome”, as in other machine-
learning approaches. However, a major advantage of the for-
mer is that it also provides interpretable information about why
a model provides a given answer. There are many situations
in which an answer is not of practical use, without knowing
the “why”. Network monitoring is an example: network an-
alysts desire to detect unwanted events during network oper-
ation, but they also need to understand their root causes and
troubleshoot them as soon as possible. An advantage of mul-
tivariate exploratory analysis is that, even if a model is created
to respond to a specific question, the interaction of the analyst
with the data through the model can bring much more informa-
tion, like the derivation of new, unexpected findings. This is a
useful property that black-box models do not normally provide.
In a recent paper, we introduced the notion of networkmet-
rics [7], the use of multivariate analysis to unravel network
problems. The name is a derivation from other areas where
multivariate analysis plays a central role in the scientific and
professional communities, like in psychometrics, chemomet-
rics or econometrics. In this paper we present an example of
what these methods can bring to the network monitoring arena.
Specifically, we present a case study of the Multivariate Big
Data Analysis (MBDA) tool [8] as applied to monitoring and
troubleshooting a campus-wide Wi-Fi network [9]. MBDA
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is a complete multivariate anomaly detection and analysis ap-
proach, based on a workflow of five steps, that can handle large
amounts of data from disparate sources. When an anomaly is
identified, the output includes the log entries of raw informa-
tion associated with it. These, in turn, can be presented to the
analyst, so as to elucidate the root causes for the anomaly. In
a context where the number of log entries is massive (i.e., Big
Data), MBDA works as a magnifier glass, conveniently high-
lighting anomalous events.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
• We illustrate the application of MBDA to a real case study,
showing what it can provide to network analysts and pre-
senting the workflow in detail, including the paralleliza-
tion of the code and processing time results.
• We enhance MBDA with several functionalities useful in
real-life practice:
– We propose an automatic feature-learning procedure,
consistent with the MBDA methodology.
– We incorporate state-of-the-art exploratory analysis
visualizations within the central step of MBDA, to
make it more data interactive.
– We use gephi [10] network visualizations to improve
the interpretation of diagnosis results, which are sup-
posed to be condensed [8] – but can still be of large
size in practical problems.
– We discuss model updating after anomaly identifi-
cation and diagnosis, to further refine the anomaly
detection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the data set under analysis. Section 3 presents the MBDA
methodology in brief. Section 4 introduces the learning proce-
dure contributed. Section 5 illustrates the five steps of MBDA
in the Wi-Fi data. Section 6 presents the visualization on the
anomalies and Section 7 discusses model update. Section 8 pro-
vides final conclusions.
2. The Dartmouth Wi-Fi network
Dartmouth College has a compact campus with over 200
buildings on 200 acres. The evolution of the network is doc-
umented in the series of papers [11, 12, 9]. The number of
students, staff, and academic faculty reached near 6,500, 3,300
and 1,000, respectively, at the end of 2018, and the number of
Access Points (APs) is above the 3,000. Researchers at Dart-
mouth have been capturing data about the usage of the network
for many years, providing a perfect case study for tools like
MBDA.
The paper analyses a data capture containing the connections
of users to the network in a seven year time span: from 2012
to 2018. Data contains Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) traps [13] sent from wireless controllers to our collec-
tor. The capture reveals the statistics in Table 1. The data set
contains a total of 5 Billion traps and 7 TB of data. A total of
38K authenticated users and an undetermined number of non-
authenticated users have been connected to the network in the
last seven years, using 600K devices. The network infrastruc-
ture supports several SSIDs, primarily Dartmouth Secure, the
WPA2-Enterprise authenticated college network, Dartmouth
Public, a public-access network, and eduroam, the world-wide
roaming network for educational institutions [14]. Dartmouth
Secure was entirely replaced by eduroam in the final months of
the capture.
Table 1: Details of the SNMP trap capture at Dartmouth College.
Statistic Number
Capture period Jan 1st 2012 - Dec 31st 2018
(2556 days)
log entries (SNMP traps) 5 Billion
Data Size (raw) 7 TB
Access points 3,330
Authenticated Users 38,096
Stations 624,903
SSIDs 20
To collect the trace, the Wi-Fi network controllers forwarded
SNMP traps with a record of network activity to the Dartmouth
team’s servers. Figure 1 shows an example of an SNMP trap
as received. Each trap comprises a header, with timestamp
and sender and collector information, followed by a variable
number of triplets representing SNMP object identifiers (OIDs)
with the format ‘<OID> = <type>: <value>’ and separated
by hashes (#). OIDs are partly represented in ASN.1 notation,
which can be translated into more meaningful OID names using
the relevant Management Information Base (MIB). An impor-
tant OID is the trap type (TT), in which the value is also an
OID: ‘<TT> = OID: <OID>’. More details on the data capture
can be found in [9].
3. Multivariate Big Data Analysis
We base our analysis on the Multivariate Big Data Analysis
(MBDA) methodology [8], a recently proposed networkmetrics
exploratory tool. MBDA makes use of two open software pack-
ages available on Github: the MEDA Toolbox [15, 16] and the
FCParser [17]. The FCParser is a python tool for the parsing of
both structured and unstructured logs. With the MEDA Tool-
box, multivariate modeling and data visualization can be per-
formed.
Intensive parsing requires a parallel processing hardware.
We used the Anthill Compute Cluster hosted by the Computer
Science Department at Dartmouth. It is a 100 node, 1200 core,
4,288GB distributed ram compute cluster, managed with the
grid engine [18] as parallelization software. Matlab and Python
scripts using the FCParser and the MEDA Toolbox, respec-
tively, run on top of the parallel hardware as grid jobs.
The MBDA approach consists of 5 steps:
1) Parsing: the raw data coming from structured and unstruc-
tured sources are transformed into quantitative features.
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Figure 1: Example of an SNMP trap in the data capture. The second OID, highlighted by a rectangle, represents the trap type. Parts of an IP and a MAC address
have been hidden.
2) Fusion: the features of the different sources of data are
combined into a single data stream. In the example un-
der analysis there is a single source of data: SNMP traps.
Thus, fusion is not required.
3) Detection & Analysis: featured data is visualized and
anomalies are identified in time using Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) [4, 19] and Multivariate Statistical
Network Monitoring (MSNM) [20, 21, 22, 23].
4) Pre-diagnosis: the features associated with an anomaly are
found.
5) De-parsing: Using both detection and pre-diagnosis infor-
mation, the original raw data records related to the anoma-
lies are identified and presented to the analyst.
The first three previous steps are equivalent to what it is com-
monly done in other machine learning methodologies. How-
ever, steps 4 and 5, which perform the diagnosis of the anoma-
lies, are a main advantage of the present proposal. These steps
are possible thanks to the white-box, exploratory characteristics
of PCA as the core of the MSNM approach in step 3). PCA is
easy to interpret in terms of the connection between anomalies
and features.
PCA transforms the original features into a lower number of
uncorrelated features: the so-called principal components. The
principal components are ordered by captured variance. PCA
follows the expression:
X = TA · PtA + EA, (1)
where X represents the matrix of data, with N rows and M
columns, TA is the N × A scores matrix containing the projec-
tion of the objects in the principal components sub-space, with
A the number of principal components, PA is the M × A load-
ings matrix containing the linear combination of the variables
represented in each of the principal components, and EA is the
N × M matrix of residuals.
Scores, loadings and residuals can be visualized using line
and scatter plots to gain data understanding. Also, the data can
be further compressed in a pair of statistics, the D-statistic and
Q-statistic, where anomaly detection can be performed follow-
ing the MSNM approach. The D-statistic and the Q-statistic for
observation n are computed with the following equations:
Dn = tn · (ΣT )−1 · ttn (2)
Qn = en · etn (3)
where tn is a 1 × A vector with the scores for observation n,
en is a 1 × M vector with the residuals, and ΣT represents the
covariance matrix of the scores.
As a summary, table 2 describes the general data pipeline.
Steps 1) and 3) perform two steps of compression of the data,
first from raw data to features and then from features to com-
ponents/residuals using PCA and from these to statistics us-
ing MSNM. Once anomalies are found, steps 4) and 5) allow
to identify the root cause in the raw information associated to
them.
4. Learning Counts in Big Data
4.1. Feature-as-a-counter parsing
MBDA makes use of the feature-as-a-counter (FaaC) ap-
proach [2] in step 1). Each feature contains the number of times
a given event takes place during a pre-defined time interval. Ex-
amples of suitable features are the counts of a given word in a
log or the number of traffic flows with given destination port
in a Netflow file. This general definition makes it possible to
integrate, in a suitable way, most sources of information.
To implement the FaaC, the FCParser defines variables and
features. Variables represent general entities in the data. In the
previous two examples, the variables would be word and des-
tination port. The Features are defined for a specific value of
a variable. Examples of features would be word=’food’ and
destination port=’80’. This representation in variables and fea-
tures has the relevant advantage that allows for the definition
of default features, e.g. word=< ANY >, useful to count the
instances of a variable, regardless its value, in a data record.
Variables and features are defined using regular expressions in
configuration files. The FCParser applies this configuration to
the data, in order to compute feature vectors for each interval
of time. This is done using a multi-threading configuration to
speed-up computation.
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Table 2: Summary of the five steps in MBDA.
STEP INPUT OUTPUT SOFTWARE
1. Parsing Raw data stream Stream of features per source FCParser
2. Fusion Stream of features per source Single feature stream FCParser
3. Detection Single feature stream Timestamps for anomalies MEDA Toolbox
4. Pre-diagnosis Single feature stream & Timestamps for anomalies Features for anomalies MEDA Toolbox
5. De-parsing Raw data stream & Timestamps & Features for anomalies Raw log entries for anomalies FCParser
The default features in step 1) of MBDA play a similar role
as residuals do in PCA and MSNM in step 3). Both transforma-
tions, steps 1) and 3), work as lossy compression steps, which
are fundamental to visualize data when the data volume is mas-
sive. However, when doing anomaly detection, it is a good idea
to include in the model a summary of what is left out in the
compression. This allows the analyst to retain the ability to find
uncommon patterns in the residual part, and it is the goal of the
residuals in eqs. (1) and (3).
A simplistic example of when default features can be useful
follows. Imagine we capture traffic from a network where the
main services are http (destination port 80) and smtp (destina-
tion port 53). To monitor the traffic, we define two features:
destination port=’80’ and destination port=’53’, and a default
feature destination port=< ANY >. During traffic monitoring,
there is a sudden burst of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic with
destination port 6667. The two previous features cannot cap-
ture this burst, but the default one can. If something anomalous
is detected in a default feature, the analyst can decide whether
she needs to redefine features to account for the new situation,
or simply look at the raw data for diagnosis.
4.2. Learning procedure
MBDA relies in the manual definition of the features in the
configuration files of the FCParser. To write such configuration
files, the analyst needs to get familiarized with the data. Un-
fortunately, in a practical Big Data problem like the one under
analysis, the data capture is too massive for direct inspection. If
we want to obtain a good description of the content, we need to
apply an automatic feature derivation technique. This technique
needs to be consistent with the posterior multivariate analysis,
so that we minimize loss of information.
There are two basic properties we would like to meet in the
learning procedure. First, main sources of variance need to be
captured. Second, uncommon characteristics with low variance
should also be modeled somehow, in a summary of residual in-
formation. The second feature is built-in in the FaaC methodol-
ogy with the definition of default features, as already discussed.
We developed a learning algorithm to automatically iden-
tify a list of common FaaC features in a Big Data set, and in-
cluded it in the FCParser repository at Github with the name
fclearning.py. The learning algorithm extracts the features
in the data ordered by their percentage of presence, measured as
the portion of the log entries where a feature appears. It also de-
fines default features and automatically writes the configuration
files.
We used this algorithm in two steps to identify high variance
OIDs in the Wi-Fi data. First, the algorithm was parallelized
in 2556 processing jobs, one per different day in the capture.
The resulting 2556 configuration files contain the FaaC fea-
tures with a percentage of presence above the 5% during the
day. Second, these configuration files were combined in a sin-
gle configuration file, where we discarded all features with vari-
ance below a threshold1. This resulted in a total of 90 features,
including default features. From their description we can con-
clude that we can use this data to identify who associated to the
network, when the association took place, the APs involved in
the connection, and thus the approximate location and move-
ment of the user during it, and the device used.
The whole learning process using the parallel hardware and
multi-threading (4 threads per processor) took 12 hours, during
which a maximum of 150 jobs were processed in parallel. This
means that the processing time could be reduced in 17-folds
using a larger computer cluster. The combination of results in a
regular server took another 30 minutes.
5. MBDA in action
In this section, we discuss the application of MBDA to the
Wi-Fi data set using the learned features. Since there is one
single source of data, the second step (fusion) is not necessary.
5.1. Parsing
We use the FCParser to generate the feature vectors with the
aforementioned configuration file learned. In agreement with
the learning phase, we consider feature vectors for intervals of
one day. These contain the number of traps, the total num-
ber of OIDs and the number of learned features. This makes
a total of 92 features. Each day in the original SNMP capture
is transformed into a feature vector, we call ’observation’, and
each feature in the observation is the number of times the corre-
sponding element is found in the traps of that day. This results
in a compression of the data from 7TB to less than 1MB, yield-
ing 2556 observations (days) of 92 features each in matrix X.
The compression conveniently transforms a Big Data set into a
handleable data set by any analysis package in a common com-
puter.
The parsing was again parallelized in 2556 processing jobs,
one per day, and the whole process using the Anthill Computer
1We used a threshold of 0,01%, taking the variance in the number of log
entries per day as a reference
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Cluster and multi-threading (again 4 threads per processor) took
15 hours. Again, a maximum of 150 jobs were processed in
parallel, so the same reduction with a larger cluster discussed
for the learning procedure applies here.
5.2. Detection & Analysis
Basically, PCA factorizes the data X into a part for the ob-
servations (the scores) and a part for the features (the loadings),
making the visualization simpler and interpretable. The remain-
ing of this section discusses how to obtain and interpret this
factorization. PCA has a number of interesting properties in
terms of visualizing the data. First, the principal components
are linear combinations of the original features and uncorre-
lated. In particular, distances between points in any scatter plot
of the scores, commonly called a score plot, approximate the
Mahalanobis distance in the original data. Second, since the
principal components are ordered by variance; hence, we can
be confident that the main patterns of high variance in the data
will be observable in the first components. Therefore, by only
inspecting a small set of principal components, we can gain an
accurate insight into the data.
The number of principal components to use has to be deter-
mined. There are many methods to aid in that decision, and
for a general description on which one is best, see [19, 24].
Fortunately, the data exploration is barely affected by selecting
different numbers of components, specially because we also vi-
sualize a summary of the residuals. If in doubt, it is better to
use larger numbers, since we may learn something else from
additional principal components.
Still, it is useful to have an initial reference for a suitable
number of principal components. The MEDA Toolbox, the
software used in this third step of MBDA, provides of a plot
with the residual variance per PC combined with the column-
wise k-fold cross-validation (ckf) curve [25]. The correspond-
ing plot for the Wi-Fi data is shown in Figure 2. To obtain
this plot, we inputted the matrix X of parsed data. The resid-
ual variance tells us the percentage of information not captured
by the model, which should be low enough so that we do not
miss much information in the summary of the residuals. The ckf
gives information about the predictive ability of components, in
terms of how well the structure among the original features is
captured. A reasonable choice for the number of principal com-
ponents should capture a large portion of variance and yield a
reasonably good predictive model. In our case, 6 principal com-
ponents seems like a reasonable choice, since models beyond
that number do not improve in prediction ability and add very
little variance.
Once we have selected the number of principal components,
we can visualize the data using scatter plots of scores and load-
ings. A toy example of score plot is shown in Figure 3. We can
see six points representing observations (rows in the data) scat-
tered around the center of coordinates. We assume that data is
mean centered, as data is commonly preprocessed before PCA,
and note that interpretation changes for non-centered data. The
interpretation is easier if we think of the observations not only
as points, but also as vectors connecting the origin of coordi-
nates to the points, as in the illustration. The relationship be-
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Figure 2: Curves of residual variance and ckf [25] for the Wi-Fi data.
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Figure 3: Illustration of interpretation in score and loading plots.
tween observations is revealed by the distance between obser-
vations and the angle between vectors. Very close points reflect
similarity of the observations in the principal components we
are visualizing. However, we are mainly interested in those
points far from the origin of coordinates, meaning that they
present high scores. Observations with low scores are not well
modeled by the inspected components. This is illustrated with
observation 1, for which the plot does not provide any useful in-
formation other than it has a low score in the first two principal
components. Vectors with the same direction indicates similar-
ity, and the closer the points the more similar. This is the case
for observations 2 and 6. Thanks to this property, score plots
are useful to identify clusters of similar observations and other
meaningful patterns, like trends and outliers. Vectors in the op-
posite direction show an inverse relationship, like observations
4 and 5. Vectors in different directions and distanced reflects
they are somehow different (not directly or inversely related).
Thus, observation 3, the group of 2 and 6 and the group of 4
and 5 are all different. This property is again useful because
if the score plot highlights different groupings of observations,
we can conclude that there is an underlaying different informa-
tion content in the features of these groups. To obtain more
information about those differences, we need to look at the cor-
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responding loading plot.
Loading plots are similar to score plots, but the former rep-
resent the spacial distribution of features (columns in the data)
instead of observations. Again, clusters, trends or outliers can
be identified in the loading plot, and lead to interesting conclu-
sions on the features distribution. We can also combine scores
and loadings in a single plot, commonly called a biplot [26].
Well designed biplots allow similar comparisons in distance and
angle between observations and features. Thus, if one observa-
tion is located close to a feature in the biplot, we expect this
observation to have a high value of that feature. This is useful
to draw connections between the patterns of observations and
features: e.g. to identify what features make an outlier different
from the rest of observations.
The plots corresponding to the first 6 principal components
in the Wi-Fi data are depicted in Figure 4. Recall that matrix
X contains 2556 rows, representing days of the capture, and 92
features. We present score plots at the left of the figure and
loading plots at the right. Visualizing score plots and loading
plots together is useful to take a bird’s view of the data. In
the score plots, points represent the 2556 days of the data cap-
ture and are colored according to the year. In the loading plots,
points represent the 92 features and, in order to facilitate inter-
pretation, we also plot a shadow of the scores, like in a biplot.
Figure 4(a) represents the score and loading plot for PC1 vs
PC2. These two principal components represent 83% of the
variance in the data, and therefore we can learn from them
the main patterns of change in X. The score plot at the left
shows that the dots with different colors are in different loca-
tions. This means there are relevant differences in the contents
of the SNMP traps for different years. The loading plot shows
that a large majority of the features are located far from the cen-
ter of coordinates towards the right side. This can be interpreted
in connection with the score plot: any day toward the right will
have higher value in most of the features. Given that the fea-
tures represent counts of events in the log entries, as we traverse
from left to right in the score plot, the days will have more con-
nection activity. Thus, busy periods are represented towards
the far right of the plot, and vacations are clustered to the left,
and we could say that the first PC (the horizontal direction in
the score and loading plots) represents the general activity in
the network. We annotated this in both plots using a horizontal
arrow.
The loading plot in Figure 4(a) also shows that the variables
are distributed from the bottom to top, and we see a similar dis-
tribution for the different years in the score plot: the first two
years are in the bottom and the last two in the top, with mid-
dle years in between. We also see a separated cluster of days
in 2018, highlighted with a circle. A closer look reveals that
all the days in the cluster belong to the period from September
to November, when eduroam replaced Dartmouth Secure. The
vertical pattern in the loading and score plots shows that the dis-
tribution of traps has changed across the years: days towards the
top have a higher content of traps represented by the features in
the top and less of those in the bottom, and vice-versa. Again,
we annotated this in the score and loading plots using a verti-
cal arrow. Questioned about this difference, the network staff
replied that there was an update in the controllers software, in
which the types of traps that were collected changed. This vari-
ability in traps for different temporal periods makes the analysis
of the data a real challenge.
Figure 4(b) represents PC3 vs PC4. Here we see again some
differences among the years and the cluster of 2018. We also
see a set of consecutive days from 2017 that depart from the rest
of days, which is reflecting that something unusual took place
during those days. This is sometimes referred to as an excursion
of scores. Another 2-day excursion is shown in 2013. Both ex-
cursions are annotated with an arrow. The corresponding load-
ing plot is difficult to interpret in connection with the observed
deviations, but there are additional tools [27, 28, 29] that can
be used to provide more information. This will be shown in the
next step of the approach: the pre-diagnosis.
Figure 4(c), representing PC5 vs PC6, shows again the ex-
cursion of 2017 and another in 2012 and 2014, annotated with
arrows. The loading plot allows to associate the excursions of
2012-2014 and 2017, also annotated with arrows, to specific
features, also annotated with circles. The excursions of 2012-
2014 are associated to a high number of failures in the RADIUS
server, and the one in 2017 to a high number of restarts of APs.
We will gain more detail afterwards.
No additional information was revealed from inspecting the
following two principal components (not shown), so we de-
cided to stop the initial analysis here.
Besides the inspection of score and loading plots, one can vi-
sualize a summary of the whole data distribution in one single
plot using MSNM: a scatter plot of the observations in terms
of the D-statistic and the Q-statistic. In this plot we can also
show upper control limits (UCLs) to facilitate the detection of
anomalies. UCLs leave below normal observations with a cer-
tain confidence level, e.g. 99%. They can be used as hypothesis
tests, so that all observations above the limits reject the null
hypothesis that they are normal. More information on how to
compute these limits can be found in [22, 20].
The MSNM plot for the Wi-Fi data is shown in Figure 5.
Anomalies are expected to surpass any of the two control limits.
This plot is optimized for anomaly detection, and the excursions
mentioned before are clearly observed. However, in the plot we
miss other details, like the yearly and seasonal patterns, as well
as the difference in traps contents. A main advantage of this plot
is that it also includes residuals, which are not accounted for in
the 6 principal components. The Q-statistic, which conforms
a summary of the residuals, clearly identifies the excursion in
2013 and another anomaly in 2012.
The analysis is completely interactive in a regular computer,
meaning that the processing time to obtain each of the plots
shown in this section is in the order of seconds.
5.3. Pre-diagnosis
The plots discussed in the previous step provide a general
view of the data and can assist in detecting patterns, like trends,
outliers, excursions or clusters. However, if we want to have a
closer detail on the interaction observations-features, multivari-
ate diagnosis tools are more accurate and easier to interpret.
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Figure 4: PCA scores: PC1 vs PC2 (a), PC3 vs PC4 (b) and PC5 vs PC6 (c).
There is a large number of multivariate diagnosis tools,
see [30, 31] for a comparison. The MEDA Toolbox includes
the oMEDA plot for that purpose. It is a bar plot of the features,
built to compare two groups of observations: e.g., observations
in an excursion from normal observations. Each bar represents
the contribution of the feature to the difference between both
groups. A positive bar implies that the first group of observa-
tions presents a higher value in the corresponding feature than
the second group. A negative bar reflects the opposite. A bar
close to zero fro a feature means that both groups of observa-
tions have a similar value in that feature.
To illustrate the use of oMEDA, we selected the excursions
in 2013 and 2017, which where shown as the main outliers in
the Q-statistic and in the D-statistic, respectively. The plots are
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Figure 5: Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring plot: D-statistic vs Q-
statistic.
shown in Figure 6. Both of them reflect that each of the excur-
sions are related to a higher value in a different set of features.
The specific features are listed in Table 3. We determined that
the first excursion is related to a large number of Authentica-
tion Fails, one order of magnitude higher than usual. The sec-
ond excursion is related to an unprecedentedly high number of
re-starts of APs, two orders of magnitude higher than usual.
As for 2018, the network staff did not have any registers
for these old anomalies, but they suggested that the second
one could be related to the installation of a security patch af-
ter the publication of a vulnerability. Effectively, October 16th
of 2017, the famous KRACK attack against WPA2 [32] and
the corresponding patch were released to the public. Even if
a restart is necessary after a patch installation, the number and
duration (15 days) of the event is remarkable, evidencing that a
major management problem took place.
Again, the pre-diagnosis step is in the order of seconds and
easily done in a regular computer.
5.4. Deparsing
While the visualizations already provided to the analyst are
very informative, it is a good idea to identify the raw log en-
tries related to the patterns found, in order to obtain more detail
about them. Examples of findings that may be interesting for us
are the specific APs and stations involved in the large number of
authentication failures in 2013, or the APs involved in the long
period of restarts in 2017. To obtain more detail, the FCParser
is employed again in the deparsing step.
The deparsing algorithm [8] takes as inputs the timestamps of
a given anomalous pattern, detected in step 3), and the features
associated with it, identified in step 4). With this information,
the FCParser matches the regular expressions of the features in
the specific raw data files. The output is the set of raw log en-
tries that matches at least one of the features, ordered by the
number of features they match. With these log entries, the ana-
lyst can extract detailed information about the anomalies.
20 40 60 80
co
n
tri
bu
tio
n
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
(a) Excursion in 2013
20 40 60 80
co
n
tri
bu
tio
n
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
(b) Excursion in 2017
Figure 6: Pre-diagnosis of the excursions of 2013 and 2017 with oMEDA.
The deparsing algorithm was applied to the excursions in
2013 and 2017 in the Wi-Fi data set. We parallelized the pro-
cessing using the Anthill Computer Cluster and multi-threading
(4 threads per processor), an with as many parallel jobs as days
in the excursions. The first excursion took 30 minutes to be pro-
cessed, and the second one 135 minutes. Some statistics of the
deparsing are provided in Table 4. We can see that the number
of log entries and nodes involved in the excursion is very large.
This means that it is hopeless to expect the analyst to manually
inspect this data.
6. Visualization
Given the large number of log entries in the deparsing in-
formation, it is hard to extract useful information of the nodes
(devices, APs) involved in the anomalies. To improve the de-
tail of the analysis, we combined the output of the deparsing
with state-of-the-art visualization techniques. Given that the
data represents connections, Gephi [10] seems a suitable tool
to visualize the deparsed data. Notice that even if Gephi can
be applied to very large sets of connections and nodes, we can
only visualize a little portion of the Wi-Fi Big Data set. Thus,
the integration of MBDA and Gephi is necessary, and we make
the most of the advantages of both approaches.
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Table 3: Pre-diagnosis of the excursions of 2013 and 2017 with oMEDA.
Timestamps Features selected
2013-12-14 – 2013-12-16 bsnDot11StationAuthenticateFail, bsnAuthenticationFailure, bsnDot11StationAssociateFail,
bsnStationReasonCode, bsnAuthFailureUserType, bsnAuthFailureUserName
2017-10-16 – 2017-10-30 ciscoLwappApIfUpNotify, ciscoLwappApIfDownNotify
cLApAdminStatus, cLApSysMacAddress, cLApPortNumber
Table 4: Deparsing of the excursions of 2013 and 2017 with oMEDA.
Timestamps log entries/tot #APs #Stations #Users
2013-12-14 – 2013-12-16 5.4M/8.4M (64%) 824 595 103
2017-10-16 – 2017-10-30 19.0M/64.1M (30%) 1,376 0 0
Figure 7 shows the anomaly in 2013, where according to
our previous findings, the number of authentication failures in-
creased in one order of magnitude in comparison to a regular
day. The anomaly took place during one entire weekend, and
as a reference we present the log entries of the previous week-
end in Figure 7(a). Colored nodes in the graph represent user
devices, colored and labeled by the manufacturer. We use the
manufacturer as a layer of anonymization for the devices that
maintains information to identify device-specific patterns. Grey
nodes represent APs. Sizes in nodes and edges represent the
number of log entries they appear in in the capture, and are con-
sistent in the two plots. The reference day shows a trend we also
identified in [9]: there is a Hewlett Packard station generating a
massive amount of log entries. The station is continuously as-
sociating to a high number of APs. The MAC of the station was
identified and reported to the network staff, but it is notewor-
thy that this behavior went unnoticed during years. Aside from
that, we can identify a very popular AP: rockefeller-3-1-ap.
Let us focus now on the anomaly in Figure 7(b). We can
see that the authentication problem can be considered a gen-
eral network failure, since it affects a large number of APs and
stations. We also see a large amount of authentication failures
in rockefeller-3-1-ap and the Hewlett Packard station, but this
is expectable during a general network failure, given the large
number of associations of these nodes in a regular day. The vi-
sualization also shows a curious pattern in Wi-Fi cards made by
Zebra Technologies and Shenzhen Reecam Tech. We found log
entries of some of these machines in the reference day, but the
number was almost negligible. However, during the network
failure, all stations with these cards presented a very large num-
ber of association attempts, probably reflecting a very aggres-
sive connection approach. We also see several Apple stations
with a similar pattern, and to a lesser extent some Intel stations.
For stations in blue, the manufacturer is not identified and it is
labeled as IEEE Registration Authority.
The second anomaly under consideration, representing a very
large number of AP re-starts from 2017-10-16 to 2017-10-30,
is shown in Figure 8. Recall that this behavior was related to
the installation of a major security patch in Wi-Fi. However,
we can see that the number of re-starts is too high: the number
of traps go above the 1M for some APs, and span the whole 15
days period.
The previous two plots improve the interpretation of the
anomalies to a large extent, and point out to specific actors (sta-
tions, APs) in the problem, which simplifies the troubleshoot-
ing.
7. Model update
Once we have identified, diagnosed and troubleshot a num-
ber of anomalies, we would like to correct the model to remove
their effect. This will give us the opportunity to focus on ad-
ditional, less distinct, anomalies, and also to use the model for
the monitoring of future days (e.g. with MSNM).
We can think of two approaches to extract the already ana-
lyzed anomalies from the model. One choice is to discard the
raw log entries de-parsed for the anomaly. This requires little
processing time. We will call this approach log-wise extrac-
tion. Another possibility, which requires even less processing,
is discarding the complete feature vector corresponding to the
anomalous observation. This has the implication that some non-
anomalous raw log entries will also be discarded in the process.
We will call this approach observation-wise extraction.
In Fig. 9, the score plot for PC1 vs PC2 in the original model
is compared to the models after log-wise and observation-wise
extraction of the two anomalies analyzed in previous section.
We can see that the log-wise method can have unexpected con-
sequences. In our case, the two anomalies reflect a general net-
work failure that prevented common connections from taking
place. After extracting the anomalous log entries, the remain-
ing activity is lower than in other regular days, and for this rea-
son the observations deviate from the rest. If we extract the
complete days, this problem is obviously avoided.
Fig. 10 compares the MSNM plots after both forms of extrac-
tion. The log-wise extraction leads to detect the same anomalies
as before, which interfere with the performance of the method
to detect new anomalies. Contrarily, the observation-wise ex-
traction cleans the model an allows the identification of new
anomalies, which can be subsequently diagnosed, deparsed and
visualized.
Clearly, this example points to the use of observation-wise
extraction as the model update rule. However, it should be
noted that if the anomaly has not such leverage on the log en-
tries of a day, log-wise extraction may be suitable and even pre-
ferred.
Table 5 lists anomalies found in two iterations of MBDA.
We can see that AP re-starts and RADIUS server problems are
recurrent. Some of these may anomalies may point to mainte-
nance operations, in which case the analyst may directly discard
the day in the monitoring model. More iterations lead to more
anomalies.
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(a) Reference (b) Authentication failures
Figure 7: Gephi: Reference plot for the log entries of the weekend 2013-12-07 – 2013-12-09 (a) and authentication failures during weekend 2013-12-14 – 2013-12-
16 (a) and d. Visualizations are filtered for nodes below 5,000 log entries and edges below 1,000 log entries, which are not shown.
Table 5: Anomalies detected in two iterations of MBDA.
Timestamps Description Level (compared to normal) Iteration
2013-12-14 – 2013-12-16 Authentication Failures 10x 1
2017-10-16 – 2017-10-30 APs Re-starts 100x 1
2012-06-08 – 2012-08-01 Failures in RADIUS server 40x 1
2012-10-02 Failures in RADIUS server 100x 1
2014-05-06 – 2014-05-28 Failures in RADIUS server 40x-100x 1
2013-01-23, 2015-05-11, 2015-09-22, 2015-10-22,
2015-12-09–2015-12-10, 2018-03-13, APs Re-starts 10x-20x 2
2018-11-22–2018-11-25, 2018-12-19 – 2018-12-20
2012-01-09, 2012-01-16, 2012-01-24,2012-02-08,
2012-02-13, 2012-04-12, 2012-11-01, 2013-06-11, Failures in RADIUS server 20x-50x 2
2014-05-05, 2014-08-16, 2015-03-22, 2016-07-28,
2017-12-19, 2018-04-12
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we show a case study of the application of
Multivariate Big Data Analysis (MBDA) tool, a networkmet-
ric tool optimized to analyze Big Data streams. The application
is concerned with the detection, diagnosis and troubleshooting
of communication failures in a Wi-Fi campus network. The
results illustrate that multivariate methods can bring light into
complex massive data sets.
MBDA can work on top of parallel hardware in order to
speed up computation. We analyzed 7TB of data in a little
more than a day, and this can be reduced to a couple of hours
in a high-throughput cluster. While parallel computations are
required to analyze Big Data, interaction with the data can be
done in a regular computer, combining the advantages of inter-
active models with the power of parallel processing.
The core of MBDA in this paper is Principal Component
Analysis. However, the MBDA framework can be easily ex-
tended to other exploratory models, more powerful to analyze
specific data sources, like sparse methods, regression & classifi-
cation methods, n-way models, constrained (e.g. non-negative)
methods and many others.
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